Finding Rats in Cats: Detecting Stealthy Attacks using Group Anomaly
  Detection by Kuppa, Aditya et al.
Finding Rats in Cats: Detecting Stealthy Attacks
using Group Anomaly Detection
Aditya Kuppa∗†, Slawomir Grzonkowski∗, Muhammad Rizwan Asghar‡, and Nhien-An Le-Khac†
∗Symantec Corporation, Ireland
†School of Computer Science, University College Dublin, Ireland
‡School of Computer Science, The University of Auckland, New Zealand
aditya.kuppa@ucdconnect.ie, slawomir grzonkowski@symantec.com, r.asghar@auckland.ac.nz, an.lekhac@ucd.ie
Abstract—Advanced attack campaigns span across multiple
stages and stay stealthy for long time periods. There is a growing
trend of attackers using off-the-shelf tools and pre-installed
system applications (such as powershell and wmic) to evade
the detection because the same tools are also used by system
administrators and security analysts for legitimate purposes for
their routine tasks. Such a dual nature of using these tools makes
the analyst’s task harder when it comes to spotting the difference
between attack and benign activities. To start investigations,
event logs can be collected from operational systems; however,
these logs are generic enough and it often becomes impossible to
attribute a potential attack to a specific attack group.
Recent approaches in the literature have used anomaly detec-
tion techniques, which aim at distinguishing between malicious
and normal behavior of computers or network systems. Unfor-
tunately, anomaly detection systems based on point anomalies
are too rigid in a sense that they could miss malicious activity
and classify the attack, not an outlier. Therefore, there is a
research challenge to make better detection of malicious activities.
To address this challenge, in this paper, we leverage Group
Anomaly Detection (GAD), which detects anomalous collections
of individual data points.
Our approach is to build a neural network model utiliz-
ing Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE-α) in order to detect the
activity of an attacker who leverages off-the-shelf tools and
system applications. In addition, we also build Behavior2Vec and
Command2Vec sentence embedding deep learning models specific
for feature extraction tasks. We conduct extensive experiments to
evaluate our models on real world datasets collected for a period
of two months. Our method discovered 2 new attack tools used
by targeted attack groups and multiple instances of the malicious
activity. The empirical results demonstrate that our approach is
effective and robust in discovering targeted attacks, pen-tests,
and attack campaigns leveraging custom tools.
Index Terms—Group Anomaly Detection, Deep Learning, Ad-
vanced Threats, Log data analysis, Digital forensics
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, with the increase in deployments of security con-
trols inside enterprises, attackers are relying on tools already
installed on the system for their attack campaigns [10].
Different system tools are leveraged by attackers and cyber-
criminals alike to achieve their goal [10]. For example, tools
like net and powershell can be used to discover information
about the target environment, establish remote connections,
run scripts to move laterally inside the victim environment,
and exfiltrate sensitive data. Recent attacks against the Demo-
cratic National Committee (DNC) used powershell for lateral
movement and discovery. The Odinaff group, which attacked
SWIFT systems used in the financial services and banking
sectors, used mimikatz tool to dump user passwords from
memory. The network scanner allowed the group to identify
other computers in the same local network. The dumped
credentials were then used with powershell to start a new
process on one of the identified remote computers.
On the defensive side, the detection of patterns that differ
from typical behavior is utterly important to detect new threats.
This requirement has been satisfied by using algorithms that
are capable of detecting point anomalies. Many of such
approaches cannot detect a variety of different deviations that
are evident in group datasets. For example, the activity of a
domain admin on a machine can be similar to an attacker activ-
ity confusing any point anomaly detectors. Identifying attacker
activities, in this case, require more specialized techniques for
robustly differentiating such behavior.
Group Anomaly Detection (GAD) aims to identify groups
that deviate from the regular group pattern [7]. There are
many intresting applications of GAD in various domains:
(a) discovery of Higgs bosons in physics [11]; anomalous
galaxy clusters in astronomy [11]; unusual vorticity in fluid
dynamics[13]; prevent disease outbreaks and [3];
To the best of our knowledge, GAD has not been applied
to solve security problems we have addressed in this work.
In this paper, a Windows session – User’s Security Identifier
(SID) – is used as the grouping key and all activities occurring
in that session are attributed to group behavior. Figure 1
illustrates an example of how group anomaly detection can
be applied to discover attacker activity. For example, out of
six sessions observed on an endpoint (see Table I, four are
normal behavior and two sessions are of real attacker activity.
Existing state-of-the-art point anomaly detectors (Figure 1-
(a)), miss the attacker activity as the attacker’s session does
not exhibit any outlier characteristics when compared to
normal activities. When we apply distribution (Figure 1-(c))
based group anomaly method, with carefully chosen grouping
(Figure 1-(b)) and deviance functions (Equation 2), it clearly
differentiates between benign and attacker sessions.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We apply GAD to identify anomalies and propose a
new deep generative model: Adversarial Autoencoders-α
(AAE-α) based on Adversarial Autoencoders (AAE) to
detect attacker activities. Although anomaly detection has
been applied to solve multiple problems in the security
domain, discovering advanced attackers leveraging off-
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Table I
EACH ROW REPRESENTS COMMAND LINE EXECUTIONS IN A WINDOWS SESSION, COLOUR OF ROW INDICATES WHETHER THE SESSION IS AN ATTACKER
SESSION OR A NORMAL ADMIN/USER SESSION.
Session ID Commands Executed
S-1-2-331-21 cmd hostname,whoami query user ipconfig -all ping www.google.com net user, net view /domain tasklist /svc
netstat -ano | find %TCP% msdtc [IP] [port]
S-1-2-331-22 ruby.exe" "tools%ruby%ridk%current%bin%rspec/cookbooks/configservice 1.exe" "--url"
"ssh://access/ssh?team= iexplore.exe" SCODEF:XXXX CREDAT:XXXXXX /prefetch:X ping [IP] monitor.log
S-1-2-331-23 chrome.exe", cmd.exe /K RSSFeeds.bat cmd.exe" /C "backupupgrade.bat powershell.exe"Bypass-EncodedCommand
JABwACAAPQAgAFMAdA.. powershell.exe iex (Text.Encoding..
S-1-2-331-24 inventory.exe "01-run.xml" winword.exe" /n "downloads%dada.doc" /o "" installer.exe" -o install -ip
[localip] -u appdatalocaltemptmp0158.exe", /c net config workstation
S-1-2-331-25 setuptestcenterwin.lax" "appdata%local%temp%ladaesda.tmp, %Temp%EWH.bat, cmd.exe /Q /c
powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0AT, excel.exe" /e, appdata%roaming%tmpxxx.exe,
appdatalocaltemp%tmpxxxx.exe", /c net config workstation
S-1-2-331-26 cmd.exe/c""apps%eclipse%lunaee_4_4_1%eclipse%lunaee.bat, ipsec.exe, ping -n 1 [IP], "cmd", query.exe"
user, "cmd.exe" /c whoami, whoami.exe" /user temp%update.exe
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Figure 1. (a) Feature space of 6 sessions projected in 2-D latent space, point anomalies are marked in circles (b) Known Group membership of features per
session Attacker session, normal/user session. (c) Latent distribution Z of 6 sessions, Attacker sessions and normal/user session.
the-shelf tools and system applications in their campaigns
has not been thoroughly explored for real world datasets.
• We build two novel deep learning embedding models:
Behavior2Vec and Command2Vec for feature extraction
specific to the security domain. The low-level behavior
observed on an endpoint is mapped to a subset of MITRE
ATT&CK tactics that are used as features to build the
models.
• The method was tested on real world data collected from
12000 enterprises with more than 100k endpoints for a
period of two months. The empirical results demonstrate
that our approach is effective and robust in detecting
attacks including targeted attacks, pen-tests, and attack
campaigns leveraging custom tools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review
related work in Section II. We describe the methodology and
elaborate on our proposed solution in Section III. Description
of datasets, feature extraction methods, and motivations are
presented in Section IV. In Section V, we present the results
of our experiments. Finally, Section VI concludes our work
and gives some recommendations for further research.
II. RELATED WORK
The field of anomaly detection has been thoroughly studied
since decades [5], [6], [42], [44]. The usefulness of such
algorithms to host protection has been confirmed long-time
ago [18] as this is the main tool to detect previously unknown
attacks.
Several approaches use log correlation to perform detec-
tion by clustering similar logs and by identifying causal
relationships between logs [32], [33]. Beehive [36] identifies
potential security threats from logs by unsupervised clustering
of data-specific features, and then manually labeling outliers.
Oprea [37] uses belief propagation to detect early-stage en-
terprise infection from DNS logs. BotHunter [34] employs an
anomaly-based approach to correlate dialog between internal
and external hosts in a network. HERCULE [35] leverages
community discovery techniques to correlate attack steps that
may be dispersed across multiple logs. All the aforementioned
techniques either find point anomalies or group similar logs
by clustering. In our approach, we discover attacker activity
that is similar to normal activity and not a point anomaly.
Recent advances in Recurrent Neural Networks, motivated
additional work in this field, for example, Du et al. [19] pro-
posed DeepLog that uses Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
networks. This approach is able to capture high dimension
non-linear dependencies. In contrast to our work, their ap-
proach uses raw system logs that contain unstructured infor-
mation, typically in an unordered manner, due to concurrency
reasons; and also, the idea has been used to detect only one
type of threat: Denial of Service (DoS). The problem has been
addressed by Brown et al. [20] who performed unsupervised
anomaly detection by extending a typical LSTM architecture
with attention mechanism. The approach provides an output if
the input log is malicious or not, without specifying generated
threat category.
A recent survey by Toth et al. [7] on group anomaly
detection and group change detection describes developments
in the application of GAD in static and dynamic situations.
Xiong [24] provides a more detailed description of current
state-of-the-art GAD methods. Yu et al. [25] further review
GAD techniques, where group structures are not previously
known. However, clusters are inferred based on additional
information of pairwise relationships between data instances.
Recently, [17] Chalapathy et al. proposed autoencoder based
group anomaly detection technique for images.
III. METHODOLOGY
A group is a collection of two or more related data instances
[7]. Groups which deviate significantly when compared with
other groups are known as group anomalies. Group anoma-
lies can be point based or distribution based. Point-based
anomalous groups are where all members are also point-
wise anomalies. In a distribution-based group anomaly, a
collection of points differs from expected group patterns;
however, individual data instances may not seem anomalous.
We formulate the problem of discovering attacker activity that
may be similar to normal admin/user activity as a distribution
based group anomaly detection. Attacker behavior may be
similar to normal admin user, but when we compare across
groups of admins/users activities they significantly deviate by
their distributions. To capture group behaviors, we need an
objective function that minimizes intra-group variations while
simultaneously achieving maximal inter-group separation.
First, consider a set of groups G = {Gm}Mm=1, where the
mth group contains Nm observations with
Gm =
(
Xnv
) ∈ RNm×V (1)
where Xnv is the vth feature (v = 1, 2, ..., V) of observation
n (n = 1,2, .., Nm) in the group Gm, R is a continuous value
domain. The total number of individual observations is N =∑M
m=1Nm.
For inter-group similarity, we measure the distance between
groups by restricting the group boundaries by α, The parame-
ter α in Eq. 2 determines the group spread and helps to achieve
uniform inter-group variations. Our visualisation of the learnt
features in Fig. 1 demonstrate that the attacker activity mainly
falls in the tail end of distributions. For our proposed method,
normal activity in groups is directly related with the value of
parameter α. We perform experiment on dataset for different
values of the the parameter α = {1, 20}.
G(exp) = max
[
exp
(
− ‖ Gi −Gj ‖
2
α
)]
(2)
The results in Fig. 3 show that the optimal performance is
achieved for values of α between 10.
To learn intra-group compactness of features we design a
loss function
Lgg =
∑
z
max
(
0, λ+ d(fi,Gz)− d(fi,Gy)
)
: z 6= y, (3)
where fi is activity feature observed in a group Gz , d(fi,Gz)
is the similarity of the fi with other activity features in the
same group, d(fi,Gy) is similarity of the activity feature fi
with other groups represented by Gy), and λ is the enforced
margin.
Then, a distance metric d(·, ·) ≥ 0 is applied to measure
the deviation of a particular group from the other groups.
The distance score d
(
G(exp),Gm
)
quantifies the deviance of
the mth group from the expected group pattern, where larger
values are associated with more anomalous groups. In sum-
mary the proposed method provides us: (a) the adjustability to
enforce margin constraints on group distributions, (b) capture
exact group boundaries for attacker and normal activity, and
(c) control the variance of learned features in a group and
therefore enhancing intra-group compactness.
Algorithm 1: Group anomaly detection using AAE-α
Input : Groups G = {Gm}Mm=1
Output: Group anomaly scores S for input groups G
1 begin
2 Draw a random latent representation
z − z tail ∼ fφ(z|G) Reconstruct sample using
decoder gψ(G|z)
3 for (m = 1 to M) do
4 Compute the score sm = d
(
G(exp),Gm
)
5 end
6 Sort scores in descending order
S={s(M) > · · · > s(1)}
7 {s(m)}Mm=1 Groups that are furthest from G(ref) are
more anomalous.
8 return S
9 end
Adversarial Autoencoders (AAEs). An AAE is a generative
model that is trained with dual objectives (i.e., a traditional
reconstruction error criterion and an adversarial training cri-
terion [16]). The encoder in AAE learns to convert the data
distribution to a latent representation with an arbitrary prior
distribution, attempting to minimize the reconstruction error.
In other words, a GAN is attached to the latent layer.
We specifically choose an AAE over other variants in our
work for the following reasons:
• In order to capture the true distribution of the latent space,
we want to filter out latent vectors near the tail-end of
the latent distribution in the scoring logic. For other GAN
variants, it is non-trivial to encode an arbitrary sample
back into the latent space.
• Since session data follows seasonal patterns with AAEs,
we can capture a variety of prior distributions on the
latent space without knowing the exact functional form
in advance.
We calculate the magnitude of each encoded latent vector
as measured from the latent mean and filter vectors with
magnitudes below the α percentile for calculating inter group
similarity as described in Equation 2. In our system, we set
α to 10th percentile norm of the training set vectors, as it
showed the most robust behavior throughout all experiments.
One can also fix the α , e.g., to a specified number of standard
deviations, without optimizing on the training set.
The process of how we calculate group anomaly score is
further explained in Algorithm 1. Group anomalies are effec-
tively detected when functions f and g respectively capture
properties of group distributions and appropriately combine
information into a group reference.
Training. Activities are recorded by the agent installed on the
endpoint. These activities include process, file and command
creation, termination and executions. We use concatenation
of feature vectors of the group as the input layer in the
AAE specifically, Xm = concat(x1, . . . ,xn) where xi is
ith feature vector of a group.
The AAE-α architecture is trained according to the loss
function given in Equation (3). Given known group mem-
berships, AAE is fully trained on input groups to obtain a
representative group expectation score G(exp). Grid Search
was used for hyper-parameter tuning, including the number
of hidden-layer nodes H ∈ {120, 60, 320}, and regularization
λ within range [0, 100]. The output scores are sorted according
to descending order, where groups that are furthest from G(exp)
are considered anomalous.
IV. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND PRE-PROCESSING
In our system, a group is defined by a set of activities
observed in a single windows session. Session activity consists
of signature names, command line text, session properties, file,
and process information. We derive multiple features including
density-based feature, session property based features, static,
dynamic, reputation and prevalence based features from file
and process information. For a given day, We group all raw
events by session ID field in the dataset. Next, we extract
relevant features from each group. Below we give a brief
overview of our feature extraction pipeline.
Command2Vec. An Agent installed on the endpoint
matches a set of signatures/rules based on the activity and
generates a log. Logs contain the signature name, timestamp,
command line text executed by a different process in a given
session. At training time, we group all command lines by
signature name from the data set. Next, we use command line
text to train a sentence2vec model[39] with 200-dimensional
sentence embeddings, with window size 20 and by setting
negative examples to 10 for each signature. Finally, at feature
extraction time for a given session we (a) concatenate all com-
mand line text for each signature; (b) use the signature model
to extract vectors for the concatenated text; (c) adopt a 3 layer
autoencoder on the all the vectors to reduce the dimension.
For example, let us assume in a given session, Session1 can
be denoted as a group of signatures and command lines.
Session1[[s1, [cs11 ..cs1n ], [s2, [cs21 ..cs2n ]..[sm, [csm1 ..csmn ]]
We concatenate command line text [cs11 ..cs1n ] as one blob
of text and feed it to already trained signature model to extract
feature vectors. Each signature model generates 200 x 1 vector
if in a session we have M signatures then the final vector
length will be 200 x M. Now, this 200 x M is fed into a 3
layer autoencoder to reduce the dimensionality from 200 x M
to 200 x 1.
Figure 2. Feature extraction pipeline: (a) For a given session- aggregate all
signatures and commandline text and extract embeddings; (b) Run dimension-
ality reduction on aggregated embeddings to reduce to size 200x1 and 20x1;
(c) Feed the resulting embeddings to AAE network as features.
Behavior2Vec.
MITRE’s ATT&CK framework[41] is a community project
to capture adversary Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTP) from real world intrusions. Each TTP or a combination
of TTP helps to achieve high-level goal of an attacker.
First, we map the AV signature rules to high-level behaviors
manually. Table II provides an overview of mappings be-
tween signature rules to high-level techniques from MITRE’s
ATT&CK framework [41]. We group all logs for a given
session ordered by timestamp and collect all the signatures in
the session. Next, we create a sequence of MITRE techniques
for a given session by looking up from II. We use these
sequences to train a sentence2vec model with 20-dimensional
sentence embeddings with window size 2 and by setting
negative examples to 2. The advantage of high-level mapping
is two-fold: (a) we can communicate to the human analyst
in an intuitive way instead of just black box anomaly score;
(b) we use these mappings to build a sentence2vec model for
feature extraction.
For strings such as (a) File, process and directory names
and paths; (b) File Signer Information(Subject, Issuer); (c)
Process thread names, function names we use tri-gram model
for feature extraction. Figure 2 summarizes feature extraction
pipeline.
Table II
HIGH-LEVEL BEHAVIORS MAPPED TO A SUBSET OF MITRE TECHNIQUES.
High-level Behaviors Technique
Bits Admin activity BITSJobs
Command launches by msiexe,
WMI, powershell, network activity
by command line
Command-LineInterface
Memory access of LSASS, Crypt-
Dll
CredentialDumping and LSASS-
Driver
Query for Security tools, Registry
changes to trusted process
DisablingSecurityTools
Password dumping and Key log-
ging activity
ExploitationforCredentialAccess
Random folder creation, Proxy
changes, Registry and startup
folder changes
HiddenFilesandDirectories
WMIC activity WMIC
WScript runs, Powershell launches
other process
Scripting
Build tools, script execution by
common tools with network traffic
TrustedDeveloperUtilities
Scheduled tasks added or launched ScheduledTask
Process injections with network ac-
tivity
ProcessInjection
Client tools with network activity
other then browsers
ExploitationforClientExecution
Suspicious Browser Helper Ob-
ject modification KeyLogger activ-
ity, Suspected screen capture at-
tempted
Collection
Density based Features. These features capture the inherent
properties of a session (group), for example, how popular a
session is in the enterprise, type of activity in that group -
backdoor, attacker, helpdesk, remote admin. For a given ses-
sion, we extract (a)number of machines on which the session
was seen; (b)behaviors which are shared across other sessions;
(c)command lines shared across other sessions. A system
admin may use same commands across multiple endpoints
to update software or apply a patch while using the same
user account. Some attackers may also reuse the same session
across multiple organizations to conduct their campaigns.
Session Features. Typically, targeted attackers reuse, mi-
grate or create a new user or session for lateral movement and
data exfiltration. Session properties like (a) remote vs local; (b)
admin vs non-admin; (c) user was idle vs active give insights
into the type of user activity in a given session.
Static and Dynamic Features. Static and dynamic features
of the files and process executing in a given session help
us understand the type of file or process used to create
a registry entry and from which place in the file system.
Typically, attackers use temporary folders in the file system for
malicious file downloads and use schedule tasks and registry
entries for persistence. We extract (a)Signer information of
the file; (b) Entropy; (c)Import functions and Sections; (d)File
Header information; (e)Export functions used; (f)File Paths,
and directory; (g) Process names.
Reputation and Prevalence based Features. Popularity
and reputation of file or process inside an enterprise and
across enterprises help us capturing the toolset of the attackers.
Attackers reuse the tools in multiple attack campaigns. Repu-
tation and prevalence of a file change over time, so in our sys-
tem, we use histograms collected over a period of 60 days as
one of the features. Histogram features include (a)Prevalence
of file, and process across population and inside an enterprise;
(b)File signer subject reputation; (c)File reputation. We want
to note that this data was provided by Anti-Virus firm for all
the file hashes in the dataset.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results of experiments for the
proposed method.
A. Datasets
The dataset consists of behavioral events (e.g., registry value
changes, process executed, command lines responsible for the
activity, and windows session IDs occurring on endpoints
of enterprise customers for two month time period. A large
antivirus company that opted in to share their data, such that
through large-scale data analysis new methodologies can be
developed to increase the existing advanced threat detection
capabilities. To protect customer identities, all sensitive in-
formation is anonymized. The behavioral events are collected
from more than 12000 enterprises with a total of 100k end-
points, which is only a subset of data processed by the antivirus
company. Even when this data set is small our results show
that it is sufficient to model attacker activity.
The fields we are particularly interested in are: (a)
(anonymized) machine and customer identifiers; (b) static
features of file or process; (c) reputation and prevalence of
the file or process in enterprise; (e) command lines executed
by process/file; (f) file name and directory; (g) timestamps (in
UTC) of activity; (h) low level behaviors. Table III gives an
overview of different statistics of the dataset.
Table III
STATISTICS OF THE DATASETS.
Type Unique counts
Sessions 5998744
Known Malicious Sessions 926 (0.0154%)
Command lines 3004454
Signatures 992
Endpoints 100233
Enterprises 12000
Features Extracted per session 340
We compare our approach with both point-wise anomaly
detectors and group anomaly detectors, which we briefly
describe below.
One Class Support Vector Machines (OC-SVM). [27] are
kernel based boundary based anomaly detection techniques
which identify decision boundary around normal examples.
The ν parameter is set to the expected anomaly proportion
in the dataset, i.e., 0.00015, which is assumed to be known,
whereas the γ parameter is set to 1/m where m (340) is the
number of input features.
Isolation Forests (IF). [28] is a partition-based method it first
builds tress to randomly split values across chosen features.
Scikit-learn [29] package default parameters were used in our
experiments.
Deep Autoencoding Gaussian Mixture Model (DAGMM).
[30] is a state-of-the-art autoencoder based method for
anomaly detection. It trains a auto encoder to use its latent
representations, reconstruction error to feed into estimation
network to a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) to predict
anomalous data point. For the experiments, compression net-
work with 3 dimensional input to the estimation network,
where one is the reduced dimension and the other two are from
the reconstruction error, the compression network runs with
FC(340,120), FC(120, 60, tanh)-FC(60, 30, tanh)-FC(30, 10,
tanh)-FC(10, 1, none)-FC(1, 10, tanh)-FC(10, 30, tanh)-FC(30,
60, tanh)-FC(60, 120, tanh)–FC(120, 340, tanh), and the
estimation network performs with FC(3, 10, tanh)-Drop(0.5)-
FC(10, 4, softmax).
Mixture of Gaussian Mixture Models (MGMM). [31]
assumes that data generated data follows Gaussian mixture
where anomalous group does not follow regular mixture of
features. The number of regular group behaviours T=1 and
number of Gaussian mixtures L=4 was used for training.
One Class Support Measure Machines (OCSMM). [11]
uses discriminating method to discover between regular and
anomalous group behaviours using a hyperplane. OCSMM
maximises the margin between two classes separated based on
the hyperplane and learns patterns from one-class that exhibits
the dominant behavior in a dataset.
Deep generative models (VAE and AAE). VAE[40] and
AAE [16] are generative variants of auto encoder which use
reconstruction probabilities [43] to compute anomaly scores.
AAE relaxes this constraint by using a GAN as described in
Section III. Both AAE and VAE used four layers of (conv-
batch-normalization-elu) in the encoder part and four layers
of (conv-batch-normalization-elu) in the decoder network. The
AAE network parameters such as (number of filters, filter
size, strides) are chosen to be (340,3,1) for first and second
layers and (120,3,1) for third and fourth layers of both encoder
and decoder layers. The middle hidden layer size is set to
be same as rank K = 60 and the model is trained using
Adam [4]. The decoding layer uses sigmoid function in
order to capture the nonlinearity characteristics from latent
representations produced by the hidden layer.
The proposed method AAE-α uses similar architecture as
standard AAE but instead of drawing samples from the real
distribution of data we filter 10th percentile to remove outliers.
Figure 3 shows the sensitivity of AUC with percentile value.
In our experiments, we used α=10.
Figure 3. Model AUC sensitivity with α.
The dataset provided to us was not labeled, but a small set
of sessions which had one attacker group activity identified
by analyst in the past were shared with us. We used these
sessions as validation dataset, machine identifiers found in
these sessions were also filtered from the dataset to make sure
we evaluate the models on completely unseen data.
The performance of the model is evaluated using the area
under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) and area under the
ROC curve (AUROC) metrics [14]. Table IV summarizes the
AUROC and AUPRC values of different methods. Interest-
ingly, we observe that AAE and VAE methods achieve similar
results when compared with each other, sampling data filtered
by α percentile increases performance for the given dataset.
Table IV
RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT METHODS ON THE DATASET. THE HIGHEST
PERFORMANCES ARE IN GRAY.
Method AUPRC AUROC
OCSVM 0.6212 0.4508
DAGMM 0.8422 0.5100
IF 0.6977 0.4833
AAE 0.9080 0.5130
VAE 0.9001 0.5007
MGM 0.8584 0.4809
OCSMM 0.8233 0.5097
AAE-α (Ours) 0.9526 0.6022
B. Discussion
New attacks discovered. We filtered all known malicious ses-
sions and corresponding machine identifiers from the dataset.
Next, We run the model to assign anomaly scores to all
sessions in the dataset and sort the sessions by scores and
choose top 0.001% (around 6000 sessions which were seen
in 4000 enterprises). We presented top 0.001% anomalous
sessions scored by model to threat analysts for review. They
observed (a) 1260 sessions with red teaming and, pen testing
activity which have similar behavior of an attacker; (b) 330
sessions have the activity of malicious banking trojan which
steals sensitive information using off the shelf tools; (c) 40
sessions with 2 new targeted attack groups tool activity;
(d) 2833 sessions with malicious executions of tools like
PowerShell, WMIC, FTP, and client tools; (e) 620 sessions
with security tool scans for checking malicious activity; (f)
417 sessions with benign activity like logging remotely and
installing updates.
False Positives. We noticed 417 false alarms detecting secu-
rity operation tasks and remote sessions as malicious. One of
the reasons for higher scores for these sessions is because these
sessions were shared across multiple organizations. Since all
the data is anonymized, we speculate that this may be the case
of a contractor or part-time employee working for multiple
organizations or it may be a feature of a security tool. Another
set of false positives comes from scanning activity of security
tools. These may be reduced by whitelisting rules.
Anomaly Scores interpretation and Alerting. Although re-
search on anomaly detection for cyber defense spans more
than two decades, adoption of statistical methods is limited
due to two main reasons: (a) high false positive rate; (b)
uninterpretable alerts. Analysts are inundated with a large
number of alerts and triaging them takes significant time and
resources; this results in low tolerance for false alarms and
alerts that provide no contextual information to guide the
investigation. To address this issue, we map raw event data into
a high-level abstraction of MITRE ATT&CK TTPs. This helps
the analyst to interpret the score with the technique name. We
also key all raw data with corresponding session ID, machine
identifier, and timestamp. Sessions with high anomaly scores
can be presented to an analyst for further review.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We developed a group anomaly detection model using
adversarial autoencoders to detect targeted attackers who hide
their activity using dual-use tools and system installed appli-
cations. We build two deep learning models one for feature
extraction and one for generating anomaly score. We map low-
level behaviors to high-level MITRE ATT&CK classification,
which helps human analysts to interpret anomaly scores.
We tested our method on the real world dataset collected for
two month time period from 12k enterprises. We discovered
around 5000 instances of malicious activity – 40 sessions with
custom tool activity of 2 targeted attack groups, around 3000
sessions with malicious activity using system installed tools,
and 1000 sessions with pen testing and red teaming activity
without any labeled data and supervision. The results show
that our method successfully detects threats that hide in plain
sight with high precision and low false alarm rates.
Despite some interesting results of our proposed method to
discover advanced threats, we want to highlight its inherent
limitations and subjects for future work. The visibility of
activities occurring on the endpoints is limited by collector
configuration and settings. We may have missed some activity
due to agent throttling settings and reporting configurations.
We plan to address this limitation by augmenting the dataset
with other data sources like email data and network data. As
part of future work, we also aim to test the model performance
on a long time ranges, create a multi-class classifier to identify
multiple attack groups and evaluate on audit logs from other
operating systems like Mac and Linux.
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